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CHAPTER TWELVE 
SOCIAL REGULATION 
Americans today are forgetting their cultural traditions and losing 
their moral consensus. The problem is both religious and political, not 
simply one or the other. A key assumption of constitutional government 
is that self-governing individuals will fulfill their civic 
responsibilities in cooperative service. This assumption rests upon the 
Christian concept of vocation: "And whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as 
to the Lord ... " (Col. 3:23). The social consequence of the faithful 
application of this sense of calling to all areas of life is the growth 
of a plurality of authoritative institutions: civil, ecclesiastical, 
familial, educational, industrial, commercial, and professional. 
As R. J. Rushdoony has noted as a matter of historical reality: "No 
society can allow its central dogma to be threatened." 1 The American 
constitutional system is founded on the Reformation ideal of individual 
self-government. It is expressed in the cherished rights of free 
speech, religious liberty, and private property. But the center of 
American life has been shifting so dramatically that many of the old 
customs of local self-government, like the town meeting, are becoming 
cultural artifacts fit only for display. Relics of the dimly remembered 
past become grist for the cultural pulp mills. Any standard of value 
other than an ultimately hedonistic utilitarianism is apt to be rejected 
as an intolerable imposition. 2 The gain in sociability seems to involve 
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a corresponding loss of independent moral judgment and conviction. 
The success of a pluralistic constitution depends on the strong 
self-motivation and, as Justice Jackson suggested in 1943, a respect for 
the faith of the people. Even a minority of self-governing individuals 
can provide the necessary leadership to maintain free institutions. But 
authority is too often associated in the public mind with decisions 
handed down from on high. The quest for certainty can lead to a 
proliferation of regulations and a growing fatalism that destroys 
personal initiative. One of Franz Kafka's parables is instructive in 
this regard: 
They were offered the choice between becoming kings or the couriers 
of kings. The way children would, they all wanted to be couriers. 
Therefore there are only couriers who hurry about the world, 
shouting to each other--since there are no kings--messages that 
have become meaningless. They would like to put an end to this 
miserable l~fe of theirs but they dare not because of their oaths 
of service. 
By contrast, the theology that built American social institutions on a 
foundation of civil liberty regards every believer as a prophet, a 
priest, and a king directly accountable to God. It is a very different 
attitude and it sustains a very different life. 
The alternative to institutional pluralism is elite rule of some 
sort. Its emergence has been fought every step of the way throughout 
American history, as a illustration by Max Weber helps confirm: 
The opportunities for democracy and individualism would look very 
bad today were we to rely upon the lawful effects of material 
interests for their development. For the development of material 
interests points, as distincly as possible, in the opposite 
direction: in the American "benevolent feudalism," in the so-called 
"welfare institutions" of Germany, in the Russian factory 
constitution ... everywhere the house is ready-made for a new 
servitude. It only waits for the tempo of technical economic 
"progress" to slow down and for rent to triumph over profit. The 
latter victory, joined with the exhaustion of the remaining free 
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soil and free market, will make the masses docile. Then man will 
move into the house of servitude. At the same time, the increasing 
complexity of the economy, the partial governmentalization of 
economic activities, the territorial expansion of the 
population--these processes create ever-new work for the clerks, an 
ever-new specialization of functions, and expert vocational 
training and administration. All this means caste. 
Those American workers who were against the "Civil Service Reform" 
knew what they were about. They wished to be governed by parvenus 
of doubtful morals rather than4by a certified caste of mandarins. But their protest was in vain. 
James Madison was particularly astute in his analysis of the 
dynamics of political power and its tendency to be concentrated in 
official hands: 
It has been remarked that there is a tendency in all Governments to 
an augmentation of power at the expence of liberty. But the remark 
as usually understood does not appear to me well founded. Power 
when it has attained a certain degree of energy and independence 
goes on generally to further degrees of relaxation, until the 
abuses5of liberty beget a sudden transition to an undue degree of power. 
Those who refuse to govern themselves and to participate in public 
affairs invariably leave that responsibility to others. Public apathy 
on any appreciable scale undercuts the basis for consensus and 
cooperation. But no basis for national excellence has ever been 
discovered that can substitute for the personal character of its 
citizens. The abuse of liberty appears to be a major catalyst for the 
augmentation of power but, as Madison intimated, beyond a critical point 
the power will tend to become self-augmenting. 
Churches must live in this new political and social environment 
which is, to a large degree, both the effect and the cause of a 
multiplication of fiscal and social regulations. This chapter is 
devoted to an exploration of some of the problems and conflicts that 
have resulted as both church and state have sought to reconstitute their 
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programs in terms of new political, social, economic, and religious 
conditions. The variety of regulations and points of conflict is 
immense: fund-raising rules, lobbying disclosure laws, collective 
bargaining, detachment of auxiliary ministries, curriculum content, 
teaching qualifications, unemployment compensation, dormitory and 
off-campus residence policies, hygiene instruction, coeducational sports 
requirements, minority enrollment quotas, employment and admissions 
statistics reporting requirements, sampling surveys of churches and 
church agencies by the Bureau of the Census that require voluminous 
information, grand jury interrogation of church workers about internal 
church affairs, use of clergy and missionaries as informants by 
intelligence agencies, subpoenas of church records in civil and criminal 
suits, conservatorship orders affecting adult members of religious 
groups, withholding of tax exemptions from churches for failure to 
comply with public policy, and various definitions of what constitutes a 
ministry for various purposes. 6 The list is far from comprehensive but 
the central problem is well stated by Allan C. Carlson: 
Religious organizations are seeing their activities and autonomy 
compromised indirectly by governmental definitions that confine 
unrestricted "church activity" to an ever smaller circle .... 
Joining most other private institutions, the churches are facing 
for the first time the discomfiting adjustments demanded by a 
bureaucratic state pursuing a set of abstract policy goals. Social 
regulation has spread far beyond its once limited domain. The 
government's commitment to an "affirmative" vision of individual 
and group equality and to augmented collective security, together 
~ith state protection of a new set of "rights" un¥nown several 
decades ago, is altering the religious community. 
Church Polity and Doctrines 
Courts have generally intervened into internal church affairs for 
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one or more of the following reasons: disputes over the use or 
disposition of church property, allegations of force or fraud, or 
specific health and safety concerns. 
The role of the judiciary as an arbiter between the social 
regulatory policies of the state and the free exercise of church 
doctrine is not a new one. What is new is the growth of affirmative as 
well as prohibitive rules directly affecting churches. To their credit, 
many courts have resisted this trend and have frequently dismissed suits 
brought against churches by public agencies simply for what William Ball 
has called "hasty overbreadth in regulating." 8 But demands for church 
files, special permits, and employment statistics frequently lead to a 
hardening of battle lines. Typically, confrontations may be the result 
of mistakes, ignorance, suspicion, or alarm on either side. But many 
disagreements appear to arise from the sometimes different logic by 
which church and state pursue their professed goals. 
The major precedent for judicial intervention into church property 
disputes, the Watson case of 1871, involved issues that anticipated the 
more recent social conflicts which have helped define new areas of 
social regulation. As Leo Pfeffer has noted: 
In 1861, at the outset of the Civil War, the General Assembly of 
the Presbyterian Church, reversing a responsa of 1845 that slavery 
was not sinful, became an articulate advocate of the Union cause; 
Southern and border state members objected vainly that it was 
violating an article of the Confession of Faith that "Synods and 
councils are to handle or conclude nothing but that which is 
ecclesiastical, and are not to i~termeddle with civil affairs which 
concern the Commonwealth .... " 
Following the Civil War, ministers and missionaries from Southern and 
border states were interrogated about their views on slavery as a 
stipulation for continued employment. Several property disputes grew 
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out of schisms in some of the border states. In its Watson ruling, the 
Court held that the decision of the highest ecclesiastical court in a 
denomination should be considered binding by the civil courts. This 
represented an attempt to do justice to the differences of church 
polities, of which there are three basic varieties: episcopal, 
presbyterian, and congregational. 
But the courts must first determine the nature of the governing 
hierarchy before they can defer to the highest church authority. In 
some cases, there may be a genuine disagreement concerning the true 
locus of authority in any strictly legal sense. Even where there is no 
such confusion, injustices may still result. In many cases the dispute 
is the result of a capture of the church hierarchy by a particular 
faction, as in Watson and Dedham cases, or by a political body allegedly 
hostile to church doctrine, as in the Kedroff and Kreshik cases. 
Out of dissatisfaction with the Watson approach, other solutions 
have been tried or suggested, the most recent of which is the 
neutral-principles doctrine announced in the Hull Church case and 
amplified in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). As a result of the 
latter decision, courts may examine documentary evidence to determine 
whether the property of a local congregation in expressly held in trust 
for the parent church. But it is an area in which the law is far from 
10 
settled. 
Fraud is another area which the courts handle gingerly. The 
Ballard decision of 1944 established that courts may not question the 
validity of articles of faith. Religious teachings per se may not be 
examined in a court of law. But common law fraud still covers cases 
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that involve misrepresentation of material facts. But what cannot be 
done is to require prior approval for religious appeals. The best 
advice is still caveat emptor. 11 
The multipli-cation of -new religious cults has -done more- than -
anything to stimulate efforts to regulate religious practices, just as 
religious tax exemptions have been discredited by fraudulent uses. Over 
the years, the press has tended to concentrate on the horror stories 
with accounts of how one or another cult has endeavored to control the 
ancestral waters of Gloucester fishermen, capture political power in a 
major city, incorporate its own city, place poisonous snakes in the 
mailboxes of opponents, raid the files of government agencies, obtain 
new converts by using sophisticated brainwashing techniques, conduct 
ritual sacrifices, or embezzle millions of dollars from unsuspecting 
banks, airlines, and ordinary investors. The stories are often based on 
unimpeachable sources and may be supplemented by countless similar ones 
that never reach the headlines. Reactions to the Jonestown tragedy 
epitomized the helpless outrage shared by the general public but it is 
difficult any longer to know where to point the finger of blame in a day 
when mass murder is a regular part of the evening news. Religion is so 
much at the center of so many conflicts that it is easy to blame 
religion. But one may as well blame politics or human nature. The 
destructiveness pent up in the human soul is being treated more as an 
elemental force of nature than as an expressions of culpable moral 
depravity. The definition of human nature or--for that matter--religion 
has passed beyond any meaningful set of distinctives. 
Anti-conversion legislation, deprogramming, and court-appointed 
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guardians for adult members of various religious groups have caused 
consternation among civil libertarians. New York Governor Hugh Carey 
has twice vetoed bills that would have authorized state courts to 
appoint temporary guardians for adults who showed signs of 
"psychological deterioration'' after exposure to a religious cult. 12 But 
it is difficult to make the earlier distinction between religion and 
cultus when the one has come to include the other in the Court's most 
recent definitions. In the absence of an accepted standard of religious 
practice, the legislatures, law enforcement agencies, and courts have 
had to grope for a working definition by trial and error. A likely 
consequence of this inclusion of such a variety of beliefs and practices 
under the rubric of religion is to further encourage "hasty overbreadth 
in regulation" and efforts to extend applications of the police power 
through test cases. Like the "intractable problem of pornography," 
demands for the suppression of cultic activity have challenged the 
ingenuity of civil authorities. 
Despite attempts by some state agencies to regulate the financial 
transactions of churches, the courts have generally resisted such 
encroachments of state power into internal church affairs. 13 In 
Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979), a federal 
court of appeals rejected an attempt by the Department of Consumer 
Affairs in Puerto Rico to subpoena documents of the Roman Catholic 
Church during an investigation of the operating costs of parochial 
schools. 
Meanwhile, churches themselves have been developing ways to police 
each other as a response to some well-publicized cases involving 
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embezzlement of church receipts and mismanagement of retirement funds. 14 
One result was the formation of the Evangelical Council for Financial 
Accountability in 1979. 15 
Business and Political Activity 
Business uses of church property and unrelated business income of 
churches are now subject to taxation, although some loopholes remain. 16 
Churches which are involved in business activities are advised to 
distinguish their business records from other records that relate to the 
avowedly religious mission of the church. Disputes over whether a 
particular activity--such as a regular bingo night, a special 
fundraising dinner, or a publishing operation--generates "unrelated 
business income" is a source of much litigation. Some alleged churches 
have been held to be commercial enterprises. On the other hand, some 
acknowledged churches have had their tax exemptions revoked for 
indulging in too many activities deemed secular in nature. 17 Communal 
religious organizations, particularly those which endeavor to be 
self-sustaining, have run afoul various regulations, including 
restrictive zoning codes, minimum wage laws, and income tax 
. t 18 requlremen s. As in many other areas of constitutional law, the scope 
of free exercise protections and lawful prohibitions or requirements is 
being determined virtually on ·a case by case basis. 
Some restrictions on political activities by churches have a long 
history, perhaps in part because of the important role churches played 
during the War for Independence and the partisan politics of the period 
immediately afterward. At the time the Constitution was adopted, four 
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states--Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia--excluded 
ministers from the legislature. 19 This custom persisted in Tennessee 
until 1978, when the Supreme Court invalidated the restriction in a 
split opinion in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Chief Justice 
Burger considered the exclusion an unconstitutional restraint on 
religious conduct. Justice Brennan instead invoked the Torcaso rule by 
treating the exclusion as a restraint on religious belief. But the 
problem of distinguishing between belief and conduct--and determining 
the bounds of the latter--remains largely unresolved. 
Lobbying and electioneering restrictions also remain points of 
controversy. Religious organizations are not currently permitted to 
directly intervene in political campaigns. They may not endorse, 
oppose, compare, or rate candidates and may not publish or distribute 
voter education guides that indicate a bias regarding certain candidates 
or issues. On the other hand, they may speak out on public issues where 
religious principles are involved and engage in lobbying where their tax 
status or existence is at stake. But the rules are very fluid. An 
Internal Revenue Service ruling of October 14, 1980 amplified its 
earlier rule against publication of congressional voting records by 
churches and other §501(t)(3) organizations as follows: ''Certain 'voter' 
education' activities conducted in a non-partisan manner may not 
constitute prohibited political activities •... n 20 
The vagueness of such rules tends to have a chilling effect which 
just as effectively silences many churches as an outright prohibition 
against addressing public issues. The involvement of churches in voter 
registration drives during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s may 
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have inspired an administrative tightening of the rules but a new level 
of political activism among Christian fundamentalists is likely to keep 
the political divisiveness issue alive. 21 
A coalition of public charities successfully induced Congress to 
pass the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which attempted to clarify the limits 
of permissible lobbying. But recently, the Supreme Court denied in 
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 103 S.Ct. 1997 (1983), that a 
nonprofit organization enjoying a §501(c)(3) exemption has any 
constitutional right to lobby, despite the fact that veterans 
organizations under the same classification are permitted to do so. 
There is still confusion about the extent to which churches may be 
involved in political activities under the Internal Revenue Code rules. 
But the Supreme Court itself has lent some support to free expression by 
churches in its Walz decision: 
Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently 
take strong positions on public issues including, as this case 
reveals in the several briefs amici, vigorous advocacy of legal or 
constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much as secular 
bodies and private citizens have that right (397 U.S. 664, 670). 
Subsequent lower court rulings, however, have cast some doubt on 
the extent and nature of this right. In Christian Echoes National 
Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 864 (1973), a federal court revoked that ministry's tax 
exemption because of alleged lobbying and electioneering: 
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a matter of 
grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations contained in 
Section 501 (c) (3) ... do not deprive Christian Echoes of its 
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. The taxpayer may 
engage in all such activities without restraint, subject, however, 
to withholding of the exemption, or, in the alternative, the 
taxpayer may refrain from such exemptions and obtain the privilege 
of exemption. 
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Whether or not Congress or the Supreme Court ever intended 
religious tax exemptions to be treated as a matter of grace, this view 
has effectively become the determining one. Since churches are not 
liable for taxes, they are not required to apply for an exemption. But 
their status as churches may be challenged and church records 
subpoenaed. The treatment of a tax exemption as a privilege raises 
establishment clause concerns despite the availability of alternative 
classifications if a religious organization fails to be recognized under 
a particular one. 
Even if exemptions are regarded merely as an "act of grace," 
however, stipulations regarding political activity by churches, for 
instance, do entail First Amendment issues of the kind the Court has yet 
to specifically address. But as Justice Brennan remarked in the 
Sherbert case: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of 
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of 
conditions upon a benefit or privilege'' (374 U.S. 398, 404). It seems 
highly inappropriate for a government agency to be able to dangle an 
exemption before a church as an enticement. Like entrapment, the 
practice suffers from a serious lack of perspective about the proper 
role of government in the lives of its citizens. The realm of religious 
free expression and civil liberty in general is a vulnerable one if the 
enjoyment of lawful freedoms can be impeded by such stipulations. 
Auxiliary Ministries 
Two axioms may be said to govern American church law. The first is 
that congregational polities tend to be favored. The second is that the 
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scope of the church's religious mission tends to be minimized. 
Historically, this represents the dominance of theological nominalism, a 
tendency that characterized the English dissenting tradition and 
assisted in the birth of modern western law. The coexistence of 
congregational and hierarchical church polities in America, however, has 
necessitated the development of special rules to help offset this 
natural legal bias. Much of the tension in tax laws and social 
regulations grows out of this religious variety, making any neat 
distinction between sacred and secular matters difficult to take for 
granted. 
As a result, some ministries are incorporated separately from the 
parent churches in order to enjoy full advantage of the law. But along 
with the special difficulties naturally entailed by exceptions and 
exemptions, the compartmentalization of church functions often creates 
new problems, as many churches have found in regard to their so-called 
auxiliary ministries. When the Treasury Department proposed new 
regulations for integrated auxiliaries in 1976, church-related 
hospitals, orphanages, old age homes, and elementary schools were 
excluded from the list of qualifying ministries. Churches united in 
opposition and hearings were held. Some adjustments in the rules were 
made, summarized as follows by Charles M. Whelan: 
The final regulations explicitly recognize that, to be an 
integrated auxiliary of a church, a church-related organization 
must first possess a legal identity in its own right as a section 
501 (c) (3) organization. Thus, an organization directly owned and 
operated by a church is not an integrated auxiliary but a npartn of 
the church. Secondly, the final regulations abandon the npurpose 
and functionn test stated in the proposed regulations and 
substitute a new nprincipal activityn test. Under the purposed 
regulations, the primary function of an integrated auxiliary had to 
be to carry out the tenets, functions and principles of faith of a 
549 
church, and the organization's activities had to directly promote 
religious activity among the members of the church. Under the 
final regulations, these criteria do not apply, but the "principal 
activity" of the organizations must be "exclusively religious." 
Thirdly, the final regulations exempt all church-related elem2~tary 
and secondary schools from filing annual information returns. 
Despite these adjustments, anomalies remain and the application of 
the rules is being tested in the courts on a case by case basis. In 
addition, the assumption that auxiliary ministries are somehow 
incidental to and thus detachable from from regular church functions 
makes them a source of perplexity even to the taxing authorities. 
Section 6033(a)(2)(A) (i) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a 
mandatory exception to the general tax filing requirement only for 
churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations 
of churches. Religious organizations that fail to qualify under one of 
these exceptions are for that reason also apt to be subjected to 
additional taxation and regulation at all levels of government. 
Perceptions vary as to what kinds of ministries qualify as 
integrated auxiliaries or as parts of churches. Physical proximity to 
the main church sanctuary is not a determinant. Some ministries may 
encompass physical facilities that are located in different cities and 
states. This adds to the complexity of the problem. 
The historic withdrawal of many, if not most, churches from these 
areas of ministry in deference to comparable state-operated programs 
appears to be behind the problem. As Lynn Buzzard and Samuel Ericsson 
contend: 
Up until the twentieth century, American churches provided most of 
the assistance to the vulnerable in our society. But with the 
growth of the welfare state, many churches shifted the costs of 
such programs to the broader tax base so they could serve more 
"spiritual" needs. This trend has been reversed in the past 
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decade. Many churches are once again providing for the poor, the 
needy, the elderly. But now the church is caught in a tension 
between God's mandate and a government perspective21hat seeks to 
confine the church to a "building with a steeple." 
The causes are more complex than any brief summary can suggest, but the 
withdrawal of churches from many social welfare ministries and the 
involvement of the state in those ministries may be attributed in part 
to specific theological crosscurrents during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. One segment of the religious community 
actively sought a growing involvement by the state in programs of social 
reconstruction. Another segment reacted against the doctrinal 
innovations of the former and chose to place a renewed emphasis on the 
fundamentals of the faith. Both tended to lose sight of the 
comprehensiveness of the faith. The religious community, which at times 
has achieved results through cooperative enterprises, became further 
24 fragmented. 
Once started, new programs and organizations tend to acquire a life 
of their own. Often they survive the loss of their original purpose and 
clientele by filling some other niche, much like holding companies. 
Even in a free marketplace, it is difficult to recover a market once a 
competitor achieves a commanding position unless the market conditions 
change or the competitor fails to keep pace. This is doubly true if the 
competitor is a tax-supported institution with a vested interest in 
maintaining its advantage. Few organizations deliberately seek to put 
their employees out of work. On the contrary, they may be expected to 
maximize their advantage by supporting a high degree of regulation. 
The courts are ill-equipped to redress any but the most egregious 
examples of political intrusion under the guise of the public interest. 
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Regulations may increase even as the capacity to enforce them decreases. 
The courts, as a result, have become overburdened with litigation. 
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1981, litigants may now recover 
the legal costs they incur if the courts find that a federal agency has 
acted against them without substantial justification. By 1983, 
according to the Washington law firm of Gammon and Grange, "only about 
100 litigants have applied for reimbursement since the act went into 
effect even though Uncle Sam lost an estimated 12,000 civil lawsuits 
25 last year alone." Lack of publicity about the law was said to blame. 
In the absence of clear guidelines, the courts have shown little 
consistency in dealing with such ministries as hospitals, homes for 
unwed mothers, and children's homes. The most publicized case of this 
sort was the successful ten year court battle by the late Rev. Lester 
Roloff over licensure of his church's homes for delinquent children. 
Rev. Roloff lost an early round in 1979 after the Department of Public 
Welfare in Texas brought suit to force him to comply with the Child-Care 
Licensing Act. He refused to do so for two stated reasons: first, 
licensure placed the state in authority over a Christian ministry and, 
second, it implied state responsibility for the upbringing of children. 
After an unfavorable ruling in Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v. 
State, 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), appeal dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 
58, 601 (1978), the homes were brought directly under the control of 
Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church. The State of Texas brought suit 
against the church in State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 
Inc., Cause No. 297,248 (200th Jud. Dist. Ct. 1981 ). In a memorandum 
dated April 17, 1981, Judge Charles D. Mathews, after noting the 
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longevity and great expense of the continuing controversy, concluded 
that the sole issue was the constitutionality of the law as applied to 
the facilities and operations of that church. He ruled in favor of the 
defendants. No further rulings have been made in this case since that 
26 date but the case is by no means concluded. 
The lack of a clear pattern is apparent in related cases that have 
been decided elsewhere. A South Carolina court rejected as vague a 
state child welfare requirement covering programs and community 
activities as it had been applied to a religious children's home. But 
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled against a minister who operated an 
unlicensed home for unwed mothers and upheld the state's power to 
require disclosure of records and to enforce rules regarding discipline 
d f . 27 an lnances. 
The licensing of day care centers, often so broadly defined as to 
include church nurseries, is another point of contention. The North 
Carolina Supreme Court refused an appeal by several churches regarding 
the licensing of their day care facilites in Fayetteville Street 
Christian School v. North Carolina, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E. 2d 908 
(1980). Other states have adopted similar regulations: 
Recently, the Ohio Department of Public Welfare published a new set 
of "proposed Rules Governing Licensure of Day Care Centers." These 
rules purpose to license and control all church nurseries, Sunday 
Schools, Vacation Bible Schools, "church-operated" day cares, and 
"church-operated" preschools. These rules would make the Welfar28 Department the governing Board over all these church activities. 
On the other hand, Arkansas exempts religious child care facilities from 
its general licensing requirement. 
The reasons given for these new regulations are usually plausible. 
The desire to reduce litigation for negligence, to restrain rising 
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insurance costs, or to prevent the recurrence of well-publicized 
misfortunes is difficult to gainsay. Yet other values are also at 
stake. The question that must be addressed is whether limits on these 
regulations can be set and enforced for the sake of civil and religious 
liberty. Negligence and fraud, for example, are punishable offenses. 
Elaborate regulations designed to prevent their occurrence may be highly 
intrusive. The issue is not simply one of finding a balance between 
competing public and private goods. Such regulations create 
entanglements that raises the question whether the concept of limited 
government--something limited by guarantees more concrete than the will 
of a temporary legislative, judicial, or popular majority--has gone by 
the boards. If so, is there any security that a beneficent system of 
social regulations will not become self-serving? If the law is nothing 
but the prevailing standards of the community, what is to prevent the 
continual redefinition of those standards in favor a new coalition of 
interests? These are some of the concerns that have motivated some 
churches and pastors to resist what may on the surface appear to be 
inconsequential intrusions or minor inconveniences. They perceive that 
the power to define the ministry of the church involves the power to 
establish, restrict, or regulate it. 
Police Powers and Public Services 
The jurisdictional controversy between church and state in regard 
to social regulations turns on the proper nature and scope of the police 
power. The interest of the state in the health, safety, and morals of 
its citizens is well-established in law. Ernst Freund, who wrote an 
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early treatise on the police power, recommended that two factors be 
weighed in determining the validity of specific regulations as applied 
to religious organizations: whether an element of discrimination is 
involved and whether arbitrary discretion is vested in administrative 
officials. 29 He also believed it "to be the constitutional duty of 
public authorities to reconcile, as far as their discretion allows, 
civic and religious obligation." 30 While he did not believe that 
conflicts between civic and religious duties need always be decided in 
favor of religion, Freund minimized the potential for conflict: "The 
constitutions provide that religious freedom shall not excuse practices 
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state; but such a provision 
does not cover cases where the peace and safety of the state are not 
concerned, and where the conduct complained of is not a positive 
practice, but an omission to act." 31 
Police functions were originally vested in local governments, 
particularly counties. As James Willard Hurst observed, the law assumed 
an active character in the nineteenth century and served as an 
instrument for the release of energy. Chief Justice Roger Taney 
regarded the police power as an attribute of sovereignty and equated the 
two at each level of government. But Judge Learned Hand later commented 
that, so understood, the police power was--by its very lack of 
definition--unbounded. 32 
The perennial problem in regard to regulation is to divine where 
the interests of the state outweigh the interests of specific groups or 
individuals. The Constitution allowed ample liberty for various 
interests--social, individual, political, religious, economic, national, 
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and local--to adjust to each other. The founders sought to preserve 
liberty by placing definite constitutional limits on the sphere of 
national and state activity. In the event that changes should prove 
necessary, constitutional remedies were provided. But a passage in the 
Farewell Address of President George Washington speaks directly to this 
issue and carries with it a warning: 
If, in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification 
of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be 
corrected by an amendment in the way which the constitution 
designates.--But let there be no change by usurpation; for though 
this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the 
customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.--The 
precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any 
partial ~3 transient benefit which the use can at any time 
yield.--
American political history may be profitably studied as a practical 
commentary on the hazards of "change through usurpation." Ideological 
and practical considerations have been equally prominent in bringing 
these changes to pass. Francis J. Powers, for example, later noted the 
impact of a changing philosophy of law on American jurisprudence and 
traced its roots: 
While Montesquieu is acknowledged as the intellectual forerunner of 
sociological jurisprudence, its greatest practical impetus was 
provided by the German pioneer, Rudolph von Ihering whose thesis 
was that the protection of individual rights was dictated primarily 
by social considerations and that rights were essentially nothing 
more than legally protected social interests. Individual welfare, 
in his thought, was never an end in itself, but was recognized3~nly because it aided in the securing of the larger social welfare. 
Such a view has consequences that eventually diverge from a view 
that lays the strongest emphasis on individual welfare. In a day of 
electronic banking and sophisticated computer crime, direct surveillance 
and the monitoring of communications systems, for example, may be not 
only technically feasible but also be politically acceptable if the sole 
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consideration is the larger social welfare as policy-makers define it. 
Although the preference by public officials for individual privacy and 
personal liberty does not need to be doubted, new technological 
circumstances have greatly magnified the costs of both negligence and 
criminal activity. A desire to take precautionary measures against 
potential abuses is understandable. But the remedy provided under a 
limited constitution is to punish violators of the law rather than to 
monitor people's daily activities to ensure their compliance with it. 
Health and Safety 
Traditionally, police powers took the form of outright prohibitions 
rather than detailed regulations. They dealt with matters of urgent 
public concern, such as the preservation of public health, safety, 
welfare, morals, and peace. 
Health and safety considerations, for example, are typically viewed 
under the aspect of compelling state interest. Contagious diseases pose 
such a clear and present danger to the community that the courts have 
disregarded religious objections to inoculations. Conscientious issues 
have also been raised about blood transfusions and extraordinary 
life-preserving techniques, usually to little avai1. 35 But the state's 
insistence that its police powers be extended to questions of social 
policy, such as hiring practices, classroom discipline, and various 
antidiscrimination laws, have led to doubts in some religious circles 
that religious liberty is adequately protected under the First 
Amendment. 
The most publicized health and safety issues affecting religious 
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liberty--such as snake handling, faith healing, and sacramental uses of 
drugs--should not be considered most representative. The courts have 
uniformly ruled the first as a public nuisance, upheld the second only 
when a threat to life was not involved, and upheld the third only in the 
case of traditional Native American rites. 36 But when the state insists 
that that a church maintain health records, or that a church school 
require inoculations of its students, does it cross the line into 
impermissible intrusion? Few churches voice any objection to 
complying with building and fire codes but confusion may result when 
standards applied to a building during Sunday worship services are held 
to be inadequate for weekday school sessions .. 
Zoning 
Another application of police powers is through zoning ordinances 
and land use planning laws, which have become major policy-making tools 
in recent decades. Not unlike the restrictive covenants of a bygone 
era,
37 
exclusive residential zoning has at times been used to keep out 
or otherwise restrict churches and religious communes. At other times, 
some congregations have been excluded because of neighborhood plans that 
deliberately restrict the number of churches and allow them to be built 
only on a "first come, first served" basis. This device was used, for 
example, to prevent the newly formed First Orthodox Presbyterian Church 
of Portland, Oregon from remaining in its original neighborhood. The 
church was required to move. Its old property was converted into a 
filling station. 38 
Zoning is also used to restrict ministries that are conducted by 
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churches on their own property. Sometimes a variance or re-zoning must 
be sought, along with a special license, if a church opens a day care 
f •l•t 39 acl l y. But so far, the most serious problems to develop have 
involved churches seeking to use their facilities during the week for a 
school. Many churches believe that education is a proper ministry of 
the church and should be treated as such. In City of Concord v. New 
Testament Baptist, 382 A.2d 377 (1977), the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of the church on this matter. 
But the New Hampshire decision was not accepted as a precedent by 
the Court of Appeals in Oregon in a similar case in Damascus, Oregon. 
The issues in this case revolved around the meaning of the original 
conditional use permit the church obtained in 1967. In the fall of 
1975, a complaint brought to the attention of the Clackamas Planning 
Commission the fact that a school had been started on the church 
premises. The commission told the church that an additional conditional 
use permit was required for the operation of a school. The church 
submitted an application, but was turned down because a minimum 12~ 
acres of property was required. The case went through a series of 
appeals until it reached the Oregon Court of Appeals in the fall of 
1977. The Court ruled in favor of the church on the acreage question 
and on another issue relating to sewage and traffic, but it upheld the 
Commission in denying the additional conditional use permit. The case 
went back to the Clackamas County Circuit Court, which determined in 
January of 1979 that the "the Damascus Christian School is an integral 
and inseparable part of the Damascus Community Church and, further, that 
Damascus Community Church's original and current conditional use permit 
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is sufficient to encompass its school operation." 40 The Board of County 
Commissioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed this 
decision in April of the following year. After the United States 
Supreme Court declined to take up the case, the church applied for and 
this time was granted a conditional use permit. The six years of 
litigation settled nothing, but it did demonstrate the vulnerability of 
churches when land use regulations are involved. 
Churches that meet in private residences have been taken to court, 
although a young congregation typically gets started this way. Even 
home Bible studies and prayer sessions have been challenged. In Los 
Angeles, a supervisor for the Department of Building and Safety "stated 
that it will be the Department's policy to issue cease and desist orders 
against any religious meeting in a private home not zoned for church use 
even if 'just one' non-resident is present." 41 This matter was later 
resolved through a letter to the mayor's office. Similar restrictions 
42 have been reported elsewhere. These may be isolated cases but they 
have created considerable consternation within church circles. The 
question is whether these conflicts are the natural outcome of an 
increasing emphasis on detailed land use planning. The possible social 
43 
consequences have long been a matter of controversy. 
Religious Uses of Public Property 
The use of public property for religious activities raises other 
issues. A number of earlier court decisions that have prohibited the 
use of public property for religious meetings and Christmas displays may 
have to be reversed in light of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981 ), 
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and Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984). But some practices have 
yet to be challenged. For example, many churches rent in state-owned 
facilities, including public schools, for their worship services. This 
has been made an issue in some places. 
Public activities that survive court challenges are usually those 
that have come to be recognized as cultural artifacts despite their 
religious origins. But the disestablishment of state churches has not 
necessarily meant the disestablishment of religion. In effect, religion 
has come to be secularized. The new meaning of religion is illustrated 
by a comment in a 1982 issue of Time: "Christmas trees, for example, are 
generally considered secular because of their origin in pagan rituals. 
Public school Christmas pageants have won court approval as long as the 
cultural significance outweighed the religious." 44 There are numerous 
logical difficulties with this position, not the least of which are the 
semantic ones. If a religious practice is acceptable because it is 
pagan, does it not thereby gain an advantage over the religious practice 
of a recognized religion? The entire history of the Christian Church 
could be studied in terms of its struggle to root out paganism from its 
midst. If paganism can return through the back door because of its 
cultural value, then it would seem to enjoy all the advantages of free 
exercise and none of the restrictions of the free exercise clause. 
But the confusion over what is a sectarian as opposed to a secular 
practice appears to reach into the Court itself. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 
104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984), Chief Justice Burger denied the implication that 
by upholding the public display of a Christmas manger scene the Court 
was seeking to explain away its religious significance or equating "the 
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creche with a Santa's house or a talking wishing well." Justice 
Brennan, however, wrote in his dissent that "it is plainly contrary to 
the purposes and values of the Establishment Clause to pretend, as the 
Court does, that the otherwise secular setting of Pawtucket's nativity 
scene dilutes in some fashion the creche's singular religiosity, or that 
the City's display reflects nothing more than an 'acknowledgment' of our 
shared national heritage" (104 S.Ct. 135, 1373). 
Neither side really came to grips with the public role that 
religion may play in an officially secular society. It is not clear 
whether this single case represents more than a momentary weathervane or 
whether it signals a definite trend away from the Lemon test. But as 
long as the Court continues to pay lip service to the idea of a high and 
impregnable wall of separation, litigation may be expected to cover the 
entire range of possible entanglements. If the Court ever decided that 
the separationist principle dictates that religious activities must be 
banished from public property, then a long line of rulings, including 
Niemotko, Poulos, and Widmar cases, would be affected. 
It is difficult to gather from the Court's rulings, however, what 
principles govern its most recent actions. For example, it is unclear 
why the religious display in the Lynch case might be more objectionable 
to some of the justices than the practice of renting booths at county 
and states fairs to religious organizations. In Heffron v. 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 
(1981 ), the Court upheld a Minnesota State Fair rule previously struck 
down by the Minnesota Supreme Court that governed the distribution of 
merchandise and held that members of the sect may be restricted to their 
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booths while distributing or selling their religious literature. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented with respect 
to the distribution of literature, and later dissented together in the 
Lynch case, but were also willing to accept reasonable regulations in 
the interests of crowd control and concurred with the Court's decision. 
They joined in the Widmar ruling which upheld the right of student 
religious groups to meet on a university campus. Later, they were 
joined by Justice Powell in a charitable solicitation case, Larsen v. 
Valente, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (1982), in which they stipulated that 
regulations may not be based on any preference for one religious 
denomination over another. The dissenters objected that the 
requirements for standing had not been met and that the identity of the 
Unification Church as a religious organization had not been established. 
These decisions illustrate the weaknesses that are increasingly 
evident in both the separationist and the accommodationist positions. 
Separationists appear to be willing to uphold a secular regulation that 
circumscribes the free exercise of religion particularly in order to 
avoid the appearance of an establishment of religion but are unwilling 
to permit an official preference of one religion over another and appear 
to be unwilling to permit an official determination of the character or 
claims of a religion. Accommodationists appear to be less concerned 
about the appearance of an establishment of religion so long as 
neutrality is respected but are generally willing to permit the 
examination and supervision of a religious organization involved in a 
general regulation or subsidy. 
To date, the Court has proven unwilling to banish religious 
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activities from public property altogether. Although it has not 
prohibited religious activities by public school students on school 
premises, lower court decisions have gone both ways on the issue. Equal 
access legislation has been introduced into Congress that would cut off 
federal grants unless schools permit voluntary student religious 
meetings. 45 Yet uncertainties remain because of the tension between the 
separationist rhetoric and the generally accommodationist effect of the 
Court's decisions. Issues of religious liberty has consequently became 
even more highly politicized in the absence of a clear constitutional 
standard. One result is that conflicts between religious liberty and 
compelling state interest are reduced to a balancing act. Should the 
Court's rulings ever match its rhetoric, however, the results could be 
far reaching. Public property represents a vast domain that is 
effectively enlarged through land use planning and the power of eminent 
domain. Restrictions on religious uses of public and private property 
would raise constitutional of the first magnitude. The separationist 
and accommodationist positions might be strengthened by a careful study 
of the means by which religious liberty has been lost in other places as 
well as other times. In both Mexico and the Soviet Union, church 
property is owned by the state and can be withheld from religious uses 
or otherwise regulated to suit its purposes. 46 
Employment 
Four major categories of issues relating to employment are the 
provision of unemployment benefits, the payment of unemployment taxes, 
the supervision of union elections, and the prohibition of various types 
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of discrimination, which is treated in a separate section. Judicial 
doctrine regarding unemployment benefits is fairly well settled in favor 
of accommodating those who lose their jobs or refuse to take jobs 
because of religious scruples. In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981 ), the Supreme Court 
awarded unemployment benefits to a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses who 
was denied benefits because he quite his job after being transfered to a 
department that fabricated turrets for military tanks. Basing the 
Court's decision on the Sherbert and Yoder precedents, Chief Justice 
Burger limited the application of the compelling state interest: "The 
state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is 
the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest" 
(450 U.S. 707, 718). So far, however, the Court has applied this 
rationale only in cases involving unemployment benefits and compulsory 
school attendance. 
Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), religious 
organizations are exempt from any liability to pay unemployment taxes. 
After the Department of Labor extended coverage to church-affiliated 
schools and even supported state legislation to that affect, the Court 
held in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 
772 (1981), that this exemption also applies to schools that do not have 
a separate legal existence from a church. But in California v. Grace 
Brethren Church, 102 S.Ct. 2498 (1982), the Court vacated and remanded a 
lower court ruling that FUTA was unconstitutional as applied to 
religious schools unaffiliated with churches on the grounds that the 
state, which administers this cooperative federal-state program, had 
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jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act. 
The Court has also accommodated religious organizations by 
rejecting the extension of collective bargaining requirements to 
church-affiliated schools. In National Labor Relations Board v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 99 S.Ct. 1313 (1979), and again in National 
Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University, 100 S.Ct. 856 (1980), the 
Court narrowly construed the scope of the National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935 and refused to uphold the petitioner's claim that it exercised 
jurisdiction over the lay faculty members of church-operated schools, 
who had voted to unionize under elections supervised by the board. 
Chief Justice Burger noted in the Catholic Bishop case that the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did not assert jurisdiction over private 
schools until 1970, when it "pointed to what it saw as an increased 
involvement in commerce by educational institutions and concluded that 
this required a different position on jurisdiction" (99 S.Ct. 1313, 
1317). Justice Brennan, who wrote for the dissenters, replied that it 
is not the place of the Court to remake a law in order to save it from 
conflict with a constitutional limitation and concluded that ''while the 
resolution of the constitutional question is not without difficulty, it 
is irresponsible to avoid it by a cavalier exercise in statutory 
interpretation which succeeds only in defying congressional intent" (99 
S.Ct. 1313, 1328). Although he declined to address the religious 
liberty question, Justice Brennan indicated the probable outcome of a 
decision on that ground by citing Associated Press v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). The majority in the earlier case 
had construed the act to cover the employees of a nonprofit 
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news-gathering organization despite First Amendment objections. Justice 
Sutherland wrote a memorable dissent in that case: 
Do the people of this land--in the providence of God, favored, as 
they sometimes boast, above all others in the plenitude of their 
liberties--desire to preserve those so carefully protected by the 
First Amendment: liberty of religious worship, freedom of speech 
and of the press, and the right as free men peaceably to assemble 
and petition their government for a redress of grievances? If so, 
let them withstand all beginnings of encroachment. For the saddest 
epitaph which can be carved in memory of a ravished liberty is that 
it was lost because its possessors failed to stretch forth a saving 
hand while yet there was time (301 U.S. 103, 141 ). 
Discrimination 
In an avowedly egalitarian society, perhaps the greatest conflicts 
may be found where competing demands for social consensus and social 
pluralism converge. Until recently, education and proselytism were 
nearly alone in being the most sensitive areas of judicial concern 
because they raised or stood in for fundamental doctrinal issues. 
Regulations that restrict religious liberty by making the expression of 
faith or dissent more difficult tend to be regarded as encroachments 
into a private domain. Although the frontiers between church, state, 
and family are poorly marked in places, they appear to be heavily 
patrolled. 
But a third issue, social discrimination, is quickly coming to 
equal the other two in sensitivity and potential for mischief. In fact, 
it may prove to be the most intractable issue of all. The reason for 
this is that, as yet, the power of Congress to legislate in this domain 
has been virtually unlimited. Twenty years ago Congress passed the 
first of a series of broad civil rights reforms that addressed various 
forms of public and private discrimination. In Heart of Atlanta Motel 
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v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294 (1964), the Court ruled that the Congress was free to seek to 
eliminate racial discrimination through the use of its plenary power to 
regulate interstate commerce. But commerce was defined so broadly that 
the effect of the ruling was to extend this power even over arguably 
private activities. 
Since then, other forms of social discrimination have come under 
attack through a variety of federal employment, housing, and education 
laws. Although churches have sometimes been granted exemptions where 
concerns about religious liberty have been raised, these exemptions are 
exceptional and often conditional. One area of special concern to 
churches is any social classification based on religion or creed, 
whether for the purposes of discrimination or eliminating 
discrimination. 
Employment Opportunity 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA), which is Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits employment discrimination on the 
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Religious 
organizations are exempted from full compliance with the EEOA only "with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities." 47 
An amendment in 1972 broadened the exemption to include all activities 
of a religious organization, not just those which are identified as 
1 . . 48 re lglOUS. Jeanmarie S. Brock and Harvey G. Brown, Jr., however, have 
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pointed out that Senator John Williams, who was a spokesman for the 1972 
amendment, wished to restrict this exemption with respect to "religious 
corporations and associations, such as hospitals, that provide purely 
secular services to the general public without regard to religious 
affilation." 49 The question of the constitutionality of this 
restriction as applied to religious organizations has yet to be 
addressed by the Court. 
Cases involving charges of sex and race discrimination have 
occasionally gone unfavorably against religious organizations, although 
no definitive ruling has been made to date. Racial discrimination has 
regarded least favorably of all but in instances where discrimination on 
any basis other than race has been charged, the courts have ruled either 
way. 
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College, 
626 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980), the court vacated a lower court's finding of 
fact and held that the EEOC lacks jurisdiction over religious 
discrimination. The case involved a female, Presbyterian clinical 
psychologist who was employed part-time by the college as an assistant 
professor and sued the college after the full-time faculty position for 
which she had applied was filled by a male, Baptist experimental 
psychologist. The school had a written policy favoring the hiring of 
active Baptists as full-time faculty members. Another court ruled in 
favor of a church which had fired the congregation's recently hired 
organist when it learned that he was a practicing homosexual who refused 
50 to repent. 
But in Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F.Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 
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1980), the court upheld the jurisdiction of EEOC when an unmarried 
teacher who had become pregnant was fired by a Roman Catholic high 
school, allegedly only because she was pregnant. It held that even if 
the school's code of moral conduct constitutes a "bona fide occupational 
qualification," it may not be applied unequally to male and female lay 
teachers. In effect, it ruled that the sexes must be treated 
identically by religious organizations as well as by secular ones. 51 In 
King's Garden v. Federal Communications Commission, 498 F.2d 51 
(D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974), the court upheld a ruling 
by the FCC that radio stations operated by the licensee, a Christian 
ministry, discriminated on religious grounds in its employment 
practices. It asserted that the 1972 amendment to the EEOA exempting 
religious discrimination by sectarian employers was of doubtful 
constitutionality. 
The potential of such regulations for interference with religious 
liberty, even if they are construed narrowly, is unimaginable because 
their applications are often unpredictable. Speaking of a Christian 
school case involving discrimination charges, William Ball criticized 
for overbreadth the Ohio statute in question, which made it an "unlawful 
discriminatory practice" for any employer"'· . because of the . . . 
religion [or] sex ... of any person to refuse to hire, or otherwise to 
discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or 
indirectly related to employment.' n 52 Under the terms of this law, he 
noted that a Lutheran congregation could not refuse to hire as a pastor 
someone from a different faith and a seminary for the Catholic 
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priesthood could not refuse to hire a woman as an instructor. Far from 
being remote possibilities, however, all that legally stands in the way 
of such requirements is the absence of a definitive ruling on the 
constitutionality of religion-based exemptions. 
The Bob Jones University Case 
So far, the sharpest line that has been drawn is over racial 
discrimination by tax-exempt organizations, including religious ones. 
The stir that was raised over alleged discrimination by President Jimmy 
Carter's home church in Plains, Georgia brought national attention to 
focus on the problem of racial exclusivism in churches. 
By that time, the Supreme Court had already addressed the issue in 
the Norwood case and first of two decisions involving Bob Jones 
University of Greenville, South Carolina. Like the Americans United 
case, which was decided the same day, Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 
U.S. 725 (1974), was a suit "for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax" which, according to the terms of 
the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, was 
expressly prohibited. The university had been founded in 1927, 
originally in Florida, for the purpose of teaching and propagating 
fundamentalist religious beliefs. One of its distinctive beliefs is 
that the Bible forbids miscegenation. "On pain of expulsion students 
are prohibited from interracial dating, and petitioner believes that it 
would be impossible to enforce this prohibition absent the exclusion of 
Negroes" (416 U.S. 725, 735). In 1970, the IRS announced that it would 
no longer allow §501 (c) (3) status for private schools maintaining 
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racially discriminatory admissions policies. After the university 
stated it had no intention of altering its policy of excluding 
nonwhites, the IRS began taking steps to revoke its §501 (c)(3) ruling 
letter. The Court unanimously upheld the lower court's refusal to issue 
an injunction. But Justice Powell, who wrote for the Court, also called 
attention to the severity of the current revocation procedure: 
A former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service has sharply 
criticized the system applicable to such organizations. The degree 
of bureaucratic control that, practically speaking, has been placed 
in the Service over those in petitioner's position is susceptible 
of abuse, regardless of how conscientiously the Service may attempt 
to carry out its responsibilities. Specific treatment of 
not-for-profit organizations to allow them to seek pre-enforcement 
review may well merit consideration. But this matter is for 
Congress ... " (416 U.S. 725, 749-50). 
The university meanwhile had taken steps, beginning in 1971, to 
admit Negroes married within their race. A month after IRS notified it 
of the proposed revocation of its tax-exempt status, the university 
began permitting unmarried Negroes to enroll but still prohibited 
interracial dating and marriage. In January of the following year, its 
tax exemption was officially revoked effective as of December 1, 1970, 
the day after the university was formally notified of the change in IRS 
policy. The university filed an unemployment tax return, paid a nominal 
sum of $21 .00, requested a refund, and brought suit after the refund was 
refused. The government brought a countersuit for $489,675.59 plus 
interest for unpaid federal unemployment taxes. 
A federal district court ruled in favor of the university in Bob 
Jones University v. United States, 468 F.Supp. 890 (1978) on the grounds 
that the exemption applies generally to religious organizations: 
The fact that plaintiff is not affiliated with any denomination, 
yet, at the same time, is totally guided by its fundamentalist 
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beliefs, attests that plaintiff is a distinct religious 
organization in and of itself. Plaintiff is not an educational 
appendage of a recognized church that may allude in its educational 
processes to the beliefs of the parent religious order. Instead, 
the organizational source of plaintiff's religious beliefs is the 
university. The convictions of plaintiff's faith do not merely 
guide its curriculum but, more importantly, dictate for it the 
truth therein. Bob Jones University cannot be termed a sectarian 
school, for it composes its own religious order (468 F.Supp. 890, 
895). 
The district judge criticized the argument used by two other 
district courts "that tax exemptions were not intended to be granted to 
organizations which violate public policy" (468 F.Supp. 890, 902) . 53 
This argument was based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Tank Truck 
Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1978), which disallowed the 
deduction of fines as a business expense because it would "encourage 
violation of declared public policy." But in the Bob Jones case, the 
court held that "the judicially created 'public policy' limitation is 
much restricted and not applicable to situations ... where the 
relationship between the tax benefit and the proscribed conduct is 
tenuous." Such a rule renders the exemption itself equally tenuous and 
disrupts fundraising: 
According to defendant's application of the public policy 
limitation expressed in Tank Truck, exempt status would be denied 
to any church that somehow committed a violation of a federal 
statute, a recognized expression of declared federal policy, 
because defendant's theory requires no showing of any relation 
between conferal of the exemption and frustration of the federal 
policy (468 F.Supp. 890, 903-04). 
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, reversed this 
decision and upheld two others against the university in Bob Jones 
University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980) in a split 
decision. The majority cited several earlier Supreme Court decisions, 
including the Norwood case and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1975), 
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which held that the equal right to contract prohibits racial 
discrimination in nonpublic school admissions policies. It also applied 
the public policy limitation to assure "that Americans will not be 
providing indirect support for any educational organization that 
discriminates on the basis of race. . . . The fact that the religious 
belief is sincere, and the policy immutable in this case does not 
obviate the need for a prophylactic rule to prevent such support" (639 
F.2d 147, 152-53). The dissenting judge, however, maintained that a tax 
exemption "has not only the protection of the First Amendment, but its 
authorization" and cited the Walz case to the effect that the "grant of 
a tax exemption is not sponsorship" (397 U.S. 664, 675). He disagreed 
with the majority's analysis: 
. we are dealing in this case not with the right of the 
government to interfere in the internal affairs of a school 
operated by a church, but with the internal affairs of the church 
itself. There is no difference in this case between the 
government's right to take away Bob Jones' tax exemption and the 
government's right to take away the exemption of a church which has 
a rule of its internal doctrine or discipline based on race, 
although that church may not operate a school at all. In this 
opinion, I speak not to the abstract wisdom or rightness of such a 
rule, but to the right of a church to enforce that rule, although 
it may be repugnant to most of the population, if the rule is a 
part of its religious doctrine or discipline" (639 F.2d 147, 156). 
Noting that discriminatory racial and sexual practices by some of the 
oldest and largest churches were implicated under this interpretation, 
he implicitly criticized the IRS for not choosing to attack the problem 
from a broader angle "so as to get it settled for the whole country." 
He also disagreed that Congress had meant to invoke the law of 
charitable trusts when it designated "charitable" as one of several 
categories of exempt organizations under §501 (c) (3). 
The numerous law review articles split on the issue. Karla Simon 
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wrote that "it has become increasingly apparent that segregated 
sectarian schools are a major inhibiting factor in the growth of fully 
integrated educational systems throughout the nation" .and concluded that 
an exemption for religious schools would violate the establishment 
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clause. David Anderson contended that Congress had already endorsed 
the rationale for denying tax exemptions to racially discriminatory 
schools. He criticized the numerous bills that had been introduced to 
prohibit a final issuance of the new revenue procedures of August 22, 
1978 but also expressed concern over "the injury which the IRS could do 
to private religious education if the procedures it has proposed were 
used improvidently." 55 Thomas Neuberger and Thomas Crumplar recommended 
that Congress take the task of enforcing public policy out of the hands 
of administrative agencies, specify that exemptions constitute federal 
financial assistance in the limited case of discriminatory educational 
institutions, and "establish a method by which the discriminatory 
admissions policies of private schools could be challenged in judicial, 
rather than administrative, proceedings.'' 56 
The case became a major public issue when the Reagan Administration 
first tried to end the public policy limitation, then tried to have it 
formalized by Congress. 57 Lobbying on both sides of the issue was 
intense. The controversy settled down within a couple of months after 
the Supreme Court agreed to take up the case. More than a year later it 
upheld the public policy limitation in Bob Jones University v. United 
States and a companion case, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United 
States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983). 
Chief Justice Burger, who wrote for the Court, drew heavily on the 
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common law of charitable trusts where a gift is devoted to public 
charitable uses. He urged the same public benefit theory regarding tax 
exemption that he rejected earlier in the Walz case, although he did not 
repudiate that decision: 
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all 
taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction 
for the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect 
and vicarious "donors." Charitable exemptions are justified on the 
basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit--a benefit 
which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able 
to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public 
institutions already supported by tax revenues" (103 S.Ct. 2017, 
2028). 
But he qualified this ruling by stating in a footnote: "We deal here 
only with religious schools--not with churches or other purely religious 
institutions; here, the governmental interest is in denying public 
support to racial discrimination in education" (103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035 
n29). 
Justice Powell, who concurred, was "troubled by the broader 
implications of the Court's opinion' with regard to the authority of IRS 
and found it inappropriate "to leave the IRS 'on the cutting edge of 
developing national policy'" (103 S.Ct. 2017, 2039). He agreed with 
Justice Rehnquist, who dissented, that the language of the Internal 
Revenue Code itself does not require a refusal of tax exemption on the 
grounds cited but concluded that recent history had in effect created a 
precedent. He disagreed particularly with the public benefit argument 
and found it impossible to believe that all exempt organizations could 
demonstrate that they serve and are in harmony with the public interest. 
He was also unwilling to say that the university "necessarily 
contributed nothing of benefit to the community." But he directed his 
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strongest argument against the implication that an exempt organization 
is meant to serve as an agent of the state: 
The Court asserts that an exempt organization must "demonstrably 
serve and be in harmony with the public interest," must have a 
purpose that comports with "the common community conscience," and 
must not act in a manner "affirmatively at odds with [the] declared 
position of the whole government." Taken together, these passages 
suggest that the primary function of a tax-exempt organization is 
to act on behalf of the Government in carrying out governmentally 
approved policies. In my opinion, such a view of §501 (c)(3) 
ignores the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging 
diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and 
viewpoints (103 S.Ct. 2017, 2038). 
Unfortunately for this view, however, the Court had already used 
pluralism as an argument for restricting exemptions in the Lee case and 
had determined that exemptions are subsidies in the Taxation With 
Representation case. As long as an exemption is regarded as a subsidy 
or an act of grace, rather than as an immunity, its tendency is to 
create an establishment of religion--whether through consensus or 
pluralism--either by sustaining a "common community conscience" or by 
"encouraging diverse activities and viewpoints." If the 
establishment implications of tax exemption are unavoidable, however, 
then the nature of the preferred establishment must be forthrightly 
addressed. 
Justice Rehnquist simply maintained that this was a matter for 
Congress itself to decide. He rejected the public policy requirement 
and cited with approval the statement of Congressman Ashbrook, whose 
amendment denied IRS the authority to create a national policy 
respecting denial of tax exemptions to private schools: "There exists 
but a single responsibility which is proper for the Internal Revenue 
Service: 'To serve as tax collector"' (103 S.Ct. 2017, 2044). 
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A month after the Bob Jones decision, a federal district court 
granted a summary judgment for the plaintiffs in a case involving the 
tax-exempt status of church-related schools in Mississippi. An earlier 
injunction setting up guidelines to ensure compliance with a ruling 
against racial discrimination was challenged by a church which objected 
to the requirement that private schools recruit students and faculty 
from minority groups. 58 Four months later, the Superior Court for the 
District of Columbia held that the District's human rights act could not 
be used to compel Georgetown University to recognize two homosexual 
student organizations in the absence of a state interest of sufficient 
magnitude to justify a burden on the free exercise of religion. But it 
also pointed out that, unlike racial discrimination, a firm national 
policy with regard to sexual orientation was lacking. 59 
As for Bob Jones University itself, it has acquiesced in the ruling 
and does not anticipate further litigation. It now has the distinction 
of being the only college in the country that is not exempt from taxes. 
Conclusion 
Even assuming that religious exemptions are ultimately upheld, at 
least in principle, religious organizations are likely to continue to 
bear the onus of proving that they are acting in good faith. When a 
religious group must be exempted from innumerable laws of general 
application, including various taxes, licenses, and laws against 
discrimination, it is quite possible that this signifies not so much its 
privileged position as its isolation from the normal commerce of daily 
life. The position of a mendicant is always tenuous. When religion is 
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placed in that position, its place in society is far from assured. If 
the history of Indian treaties and the breakup of Indian reservations 
are any indication, the consequent isolation and powerlessness do not 
have to be deliberately sought out by a social group. A special status 
can be a means of subjugation when it does not carry with it effective 
political power. The privileges, such as they are, can be effectively 
choked off in the tangle of additional amendments, interpretations, and 
exceptions. 
It is not only restrictions but the exemptions themselves that may 
be described as as ''prophylactic." They may represent the political 
equivalent of a quarantine against practices the lawmakers have chosen 
to condemn. Law does not persuade; it compels. Where it does not 
integrate, it tends to isolate. Therein lies much of its power. The 
historical movement of the law from relationships based on status to 
contract seems to have been diverted into new status channels. Laws 
that are not generally applicable are inherently discriminatory. The 
awarding or denying of exemptions may be temporarily expedient but they 
do little if anything to resolve the contradictions they conceal. 
The same question faces both church and state: By what standard are 
they to be governed? Until this issue is settled and a common ground is 
reached, the power of the state to regulate is likely to dominate the 
relationship. But the balancing of irreconcilable political and 
religious interpretations of constitutional values is a phenomenon that 
is most characteristic of transitions. Sooner or later the hard choices 
between them must be made and will be enforced. 
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